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Reviewed by Renée Lettow Lerner
Amalia Kessler highlights fundamental problems with the adversarial
system as it operates in the United States, problems which are crushing parties.
Lawyers and judges—and even legal academics—are reluctant to acknowledge
the depth of the problem. From time to time legal academics, commissions, and
rules committees suggest tweaking this or that procedure. But the difficulty is
far beyond fixing by tweaks.
Here’s an example: Why are depositions so long, so costly, and so pointless?
Partisan lawyer control of depositions has ruined them as an efficient tool of
fact investigation. Without strong judicial control, the deposition degenerates
into partisan procedural bickering. American legal professionals are now so
inured to this inefficiency and expense that they hardly notice. Lawyers paid
by the hour have a financial incentive not to notice. A presiding judge on the
continent of Europe examining a witness can cut straight to the heart of the
matter in a few minutes. It would be salutary for every American lawyer, judge,
legal academic, and civil party to see this judicial examination, to remind us of
what we’re giving up with our obsession with adversarialism.
Another example: The American legal system almost never fully adjudicates
cases on the merits. Trials are vanishing. In federal courts, less than two
percent of civil cases are decided following a trial, and in state courts less
than four percent.1 Less than five percent of criminal cases are decided after a
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trial.2 Instead, we have in civil cases some dismissals or summary judgments,
but primarily settlement. In criminal cases, we have plea bargaining. What’s
wrong with settlement and plea bargaining? Settlement negotiations turn
in part on the merits of the case. But often, more importantly, results of
negotiations depend on the parties’ tolerance of risk and delay, and the huge
expected costs of litigation.3 Even in this era of settlement, the administrative
costs of the tort system are high. For the decade 2000-2010, the total cost of the
tort system averaged $241.4 billion per year, of which 24.3% was administrative
expense—including legal expenses—for an average of $58.7 billion per year.4
Plea bargaining is inherently coercive. The government, with its monopoly
of charging power, can offer a defendant such a discount on a sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea that it’s hard to refuse, no matter what the facts.
Again, what’s driving prosecutors to offer such deals is the huge cost of
litigation.5
And often ignored are the millions of pro se parties flooding lower courts.
These parties don’t want to or can’t hire lawyers, because of the expense.
Pro se parties’ suits concern matters such as debt, landlord-tenant disputes,
immigration, domestic violence, divorce, and child custody. Without legal
guidance, these parties flounder. They don’t know how to present key
evidence, or even what evidence is relevant.6 Many judges and clerks provide
little assistance, either because guiding parties takes too much time and
effort, or because court personnel are afraid to contravene adversarial norms.7
2.

For fiscal year 2016 in the U.S. district courts, of 77,318 total criminal defendants whose cases
reached disposition, 226 received a disposition by bench trial, or 0.3%, and 1,627 received a
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Other judges help pro se litigants in a way that’s completely discretionary and
inconsistent.8
It’s no wonder that in the World Justice Project’s most recent Rule of Law
Index, the United States’ civil justice system received an abysmal score for
“accessibility and affordability.”9
Our system of adjudication, in short, is a failure. How did it get this way?
Why is the American legal profession so complacent? Why are legal academics
so silent? And what can be done?
Kessler’s book answers these questions. She puts the blame where it belongs,
on Americans’ unthinking adoration of adversarialism. American lawyers
have worked hard to foster this blind reverence. A few persons have dared
to challenge it.10 Kessler has the historical and comparative knowledge to do
so effectively. Her book demonstrates, from the early nineteenth century, the
harmful effects of lawyer championing of adversarial procedure. And Kessler
shows that there are practical alternatives. These alternatives are found not
just in other legal systems, but in our own history.
The main difference between adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings
is who controls presentation of evidence: the parties, meaning the lawyers,
or judges. On the continent of Europe in civil cases, the parties nominate—
suggest to the judge—evidence such as witnesses and documents. The judge
questions parties and lawyers, reviews documents, calls witnesses, and
examines them personally. In modern practice, counsel for the parties are
present at examinations of witnesses, but they are not the primary questioners.
Proceedings are discontinuous, going forward in discrete, logical stages. In
contrast, a lay jury requires proceedings that are continuous, with all evidence
heard at once in a concentrated trial. On the continent, if a defendant is found
8.
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not liable, there is no need to hear evidence about damages. Appeals are
thorough, on questions of fact as well as law, and on the merits (3).11
Lawyers and judges tend to identify the American legal tradition exclusively
with common-law, adversarial procedure.12 Many American legal professionals
are not aware that our entire system of pretrial discovery—depositions,
interrogatories, document discovery, and the rest—is drawn from equity, a
nonadversarial tradition.13 This ignorance is understandable, because lawyers
took control of these practices and transformed them to their liking. In this
book, Kessler shows that the assumption of an exclusively adversarial tradition
in America is mistaken. She reveals the rich vein of American procedure that
is nonadversarial, or, as she puts it, quasi-inquisitorial. Courts that eschewed
adversarial proceedings included courts of equity, conciliation courts, and
Freedmen’s Bureau courts.
Lawyers Transform Equity from Inquisitorial to Adversarial
Kessler’s story of the fate of New York’s court of equity is especially
fascinating, and instructive. Few members of the legal profession today
understand the significance of equity in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
In part, that’s because of the way we teach civil procedure. We often discuss
jury trial—or at least its former importance—without spending much time
explaining that it was necessary for the legal system as a whole, from its earliest
days, to have an alternative. We rarely explain to students the differences
between the systems of “common law” (or “law”) and equity—and the reasons
for these differences.
The mere term “common law” often confuses law students and lawyers.
They tend to associate the term with law as declared in judicial decisions as
opposed to statutes. Sometimes they use it to refer to the Anglo-American
system as a whole, as opposed to the civil law tradition that developed on
the continent of Europe. They don’t understand that “common law” refers
to a system developed in a particular set of English courts with particular
jurisdiction and procedure. The common-law courts were characterized by
strict limits on joinder of parties and claims; pleading down to one or few
factual issues; oral and public trial; the inability of parties or other interested
11.
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persons to testify; narrow remedies; lack of appeal on the merits; and—driving
the rest—decision-making by lay juries.14
As is evident, common-law procedure could not adequately handle
disputes that were factually complex, involved multiple parties and claims, or
required complicated remedies such as injunctions. Because of the limitations
of common-law procedure, it was vital to have an alternative. The main
alternative was equity, as administered in the Court of Chancery. In equity, a
judge decided the case, not a jury. Judicial officers were active in gathering and
evaluating documents and testimony. Chancery drew inspiration for much of
its practice from the inquisitorial systems on the continent of Europe.15
England passed the system of equity to the American colonies, hence to
the states. One of the many strengths of the book is Kessler’s illumination
of English practice, and the ways in which American practice drew from it
or departed from it. The transatlantic dialogue about procedure during this
period was powerful, with the Americans and English borrowing ideas from
each other.
Kessler lays out the English Chancery practice of examining witnesses: in
private, without parties’ counsel present, by a court official or court-appointed
commissioners, “gravely, temperately, and leisurely,” “without any menace,
disturbance, or interruption,” with testimony recorded in writing, and with a
general prohibition on examining witnesses repeatedly (32-33). The New York
court of equity borrowed these features, which were intended to prevent the
parties from securing perjured, or unreliable, testimony. A salient characteristic
of the adversarial system is the bias effect. Because of party gathering and
presentation of proofs, witnesses and other evidence tend to be strongly biased,
obfuscating the truth. Equity procedure aimed to reduce the bias effect.
In the new republic, American judges such as James Kent and Joseph Story
extolled the role of the equity judge. Such a judge, they explained, needed not
only legal learning but a highly developed morality. Equity played a special role
in protecting the weak, including minors, women, and the mentally ill. Because
equity judges were far more active in shaping litigation and investigating facts
than common-law judges, they had the potential to mitigate another of the
adversarial system’s worst defects: the wealth effect. Adversarial procedure
gives powerful advantages to the wealthy, who can afford the most persuasive
lawyers and partisan experts.
In other words, an inquisitorial system treats investigation and adjudication
of claims as a public good. The parties do not bear the costs themselves. So
inquisitorial systems are—or at least have the potential to be—more accessible
to and protective of the poor.
14.
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But equity courts in England and in New York suffered from a fatal mistake.
These courts did not have enough judicial staff. Running an inquisitorial
system requires more judges or court staff than does a common-law system,
because judicial personnel actively investigate a case and examine witnesses.
In England until the nineteenth century, a single man, the Lord Chancellor,
ran the entire system of equity with little assistance. Likewise, in the early
nineteenth century, New York had only one chancellor. Not surprisingly,
therefore, both the English and New York courts of equity began to be plagued
with delay.
These delays grew worse, and eventually intolerable, because of equity
courts’ rising caseload. Equity courts were vital to support the growing
commercial economy of England and New York. Courts of equity handled,
among other issues, matters concerning mortgages and business associations.
As Kessler shows, in New York the court of chancery was centrally involved in
collection of debt.
Kessler provides deep economic, political, and social context for the
procedural changes she describes. In the chapters on chancery, for example, she
discusses the transformation of a subsistence economy into a market economy.
She is attentive to both the internal conditions of the legal system—such as the
understaffing of chancery—and external influences—such as anxieties about
the change to a market economy, the effects of the financial panics of 1837 and
1839, and the rise of mass democracy.
Lawyers took advantage of both the understaffing of chancery and the
growing view that democracy required more public institutions to insert
themselves into examinations of chancery witnesses. Well before the Field
Code formally merged law and equity in New York in 1848, the parties’ lawyers
not only were routinely present at examination of chancery witnesses, but did
all or virtually all the questioning themselves.16 Cross-examination of a single
witness could last days. The result was that chancery became less inquisitorial
and more adversarial. As Kessler observes, “One of the most important
consequences of the new dominance of lawyers in chancery proceedings was a
significant increase in cost and delay” (102).
To uncover these changes, Kessler has done extensive archival research.
She has unearthed telling contrasts between the written record of witness
examinations before the lawyers got involved, and after. In the era before the
parties’ lawyers inserted themselves, records of witness examinations were
brief summaries of the witness’s testimony and the conclusions the taker of
testimony drew from it. After the lawyers showed up, the written record grew
much longer and began to read more like a verbatim transcript, with extensive
wrangling between the lawyers over the propriety of questions and answers.
The resemblance to a modern deposition is not accidental.
16.

On the subsequent history of the Field Code’s merger of law and equity, see Kellen Funk,
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The Importance of Lawyers’ Interests
Why were lawyers so eager to insert themselves into witness examination?
There were a variety of reasons, some immediate and others broader. On
the immediate side, Kessler acknowledges that lawyers, by dominating
proceedings, wanted to gain strategic advantage in litigation.
It would have been worth, too, discussing the importance of lawyers’ fees.
The more lawyers’ skill is perceived as shaping the outcome of litigation, the
more money they can charge clients. Therefore, adversarial systems favor
higher lawyer incomes.17
To enjoy the higher incomes that adversarial procedure could bring, lawyers
had to release themselves from regulation of their fees. During this period,
American lawyers pushed hard to get free from any vestiges of restrictions
imposed by courts or legislatures.18 When it came to fees, American lawyers
presented themselves as businessmen who should enjoy freedom of contract
just like other businessmen—including the use of contingent fees. In contrast
to the regulated English bar, which was prohibited from charging contingent
fees, American lawyers gained total freedom to contract for fees. As a result,
the American bar was more entrepreneurial and aggressive. American lawyers’
freedom respecting fees was one reason the United States never adopted the
rule common to the rest of the world: The loser in litigation pays the winner’s
legal expenses, including lawyer fees.
Kessler reveals the broader political and social context in which lawyers
operated. She especially highlights lawyers’ efforts, until now understudied,
to display the virtues of civic republicanism. Antebellum lawyers faced serious
challenges from mass democracy. Hostility toward the legal profession was
strong, because of concern that lawyers fomented disputes and were too
expensive.
In response, American lawyers—not for the last time19—wrapped themselves
in virtue, justice, democracy, and liberty. In portraits, lawyers wrapped
themselves in a toga, the symbol of ancient civic republican virtue. The book
includes, along with other vivid images, an arresting 1809-1810 portrait of
Virginia lawyer William Wirt in a toga (155).
American lawyers claimed that they were virtuous truth-seekers exposing
the vice that could undermine not only commercial relations and justice,
but democracy and liberty. Lawyers demonized judge-empowering courts of
equity, and valorized their own oratory. Echoing seventeenth-century English
17.
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rhetoric, American lawyers linked courts of equity with absolutist rule, and
the common law with liberty. They eagerly imported common-law practices
into equity. Lawyers emphasized their love of virtue in arguments to the jury
and cross-examination. Lawyers glossed over the possibility that both of
these could be misleading or promote obfuscation. Kessler has found choice
examples in the unpublished diary of a small-town New York lawyer, Henry
Vanderlyn. Vanderlyn especially prided himself on his cross-examination of an
adverse witness in a chancery case, in which he gloated that he had revealed
the wicked fraud of the “infamous villain” (186). This single cross-examination
took six days.
Lawyers’ claims of civic virtue enhanced not only their standing in their
communities, but also their chances of election to public office. Many lawyers
of that era had political ambitions. Kessler discusses lawyers’ dominance of
legislatures of the period, both state and federal. By the 1840s and 1850s, for
example, 67% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives were
lawyers (152).20 Lawyers especially predominated on legislative committees
concerning legal procedure, and therefore were well-positioned to propose
and enact legislation favoring the profession. Such legislation included
requirements that chancery testimony be taken orally and in public—that is,
adversarial examination and cross-examination by lawyers (96-97). The fox
was guarding the henhouse.
Kessler does a great service in uncovering the self-interested motives of
lawyers. She mentions the weakness of the American bench, in contrast to the
powerful English bench (166, 330-31). It would be good to hear more about
the American bench’s weakness. The turn to greater adversarialism required
participation by not just lawyers, but also judges. Lawyers became more
aggressive, but judges had to let them take control.
Kessler points out that in New York chancery, rising caseloads with not
enough addition of judges was partly responsible for handing over authority to
examine witnesses to lawyers. Chancellor James Kent authorized examination
of witnesses by counsel, in an effort to curb delay. He soon regretted it. The
law of unintended consequences operated with a vengeance; delays grew worse
than ever, along with costs. Kent might have predicted that giving lawyers a
greater adversarial role would never result in more efficiency.
Another important development that weakened the bench during this
period was the advent of judicial elections.21 Judicial elections led to corruption
of the bench by party machines in some areas, and also greater dependence
of judges on the bar for nomination and election. The trial bench, especially,
diminished in power and prestige. Judges in many states lost the power to
20.

Citing Mark C. Miller, The High Priests of American Politics: The Role of Lawyers
in American Political Institutions 58 (1995).
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Lerner, & Smith, supra note 14, at 503-13.
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comment on evidence to the jury.22 Judicial comment on evidence was one of
the principal means that English judges used to prevent counsel from having
too much emotional sway over the jury. Judicial comment was so powerful in
England in civil cases—and English judges were so generally respected—that
in the mid-nineteenth century many English legal professionals argued that
jury trial was an unnecessary bother and expense. From the mid-nineteenth
century on, England began curtailing use of civil jury trials; today they are
virtually abolished.23 Bench trials occur instead. Because they sit without juries
in civil cases, English judges are active on the bench, and don’t hesitate to ask
questions of witnesses. English barristers presenting a case or arguing before
judges are businesslike. They do not make the obvious emotional appeals that
American lawyers make to lay juries.
Conciliation Courts and Freedmen’s Bureau Courts
Kessler examines two other alternatives to adversarial proceedings besides
equity: conciliation courts and Freedmen’s Bureau courts. Conciliation courts
originated in the revolutionary French bureaux de conciliation, established in
1790, and spread to other European countries including Spain. Kessler is wellpositioned to explore this French influence, as she has studied and written
extensively about French tribunals, especially merchant courts.24 Through
Spanish influence, Florida and California established a variant of these courts,
known as alcaldes courts. Several other state legislatures and constitutional
conventions seriously considered adopting conciliation courts, and a few
authorized them. These courts, however, either were never actually established
or soon sputtered and died. The Freedmen’s Bureau courts were modeled on
the conciliation courts. During military occupation of the South, Freedmen’s
Bureau courts provided some measure of justice to newly freed AfricanAmericans. But they depended completely on military force, and ended with
the withdrawal of Northern armies.
Both the conciliation courts and the Freedmen’s Bureau courts had the
admirable goal of reducing the wealth effect. They were intended to provide
ready access to justice for the poor, without the need to hire lawyers. Supporters
of conciliation courts were particularly concerned to resolve disputes about
debt (in Florida) and to quiet labor unrest (in New York). Evangelical
Christians—who gave high priority to the peaceful reconciliation of differences
and to justice for the poor and newly free—strongly promoted both courts.
22.
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Neither of these courts was supposed to be staffed by legal professionals,
and neither was supposed to apply formal law. The idea was that the judges
would command respect because of their high position in the community, and
they would encourage litigants to follow community norms. In the conciliation
courts, this was really a sort of mediation. If the parties could not agree, they
could proceed to an ordinary civil suit. Applying Max Weber’s categories,
conciliation courts and Freedmen’s Bureau courts offered “kadi justice” as
opposed to formal rationality and fixed legal rules. As Weber conceived it, the
kadi, Islamic law judges, used their own authority and community norms to
achieve personalized justice without regard to predictability (227).25 Indeed,
the Spanish word alcalde derives from al-kadi.
This informal, personal conception of law ran into many difficulties
in the American context. In the relatively egalitarian American society, it
was unclear who, if anyone, had sufficient extralegal authority to persuade
litigants to defer and agree. Community norms were also often disputed.
This problem was especially acute in the Freedmen’s Bureau courts. A gulf
divided the expectations of the Southern white planters, on the one hand,
and on the other of African-American workers and the Northern army officers
who served as judges, who espoused free labor beliefs. Predictably, Southern
whites and Northern Democrats attacked the Freedmen’s Bureau courts as an
“oppression,” and a “Star Chamber inquisition[],” “without any fixed rules of
law (312-314).” This opposition praised adversarial procedure. But regardless
of whether the system was adversarial or inquisitorial, in the American context,
it was highly desirable for judges to have legal training, and to derive their
authority from the formal, predictable law they applied. The Freedmen’s
Bureau courts were a solution that could only be temporary.
Solutions
What about a more permanent solution to the woes of our adversarial
system? Kessler is under no illusions about the difficulties. Her entire book
illustrates the opposition one can expect from the lawyers. I would add, many
judges are not inclined to help. In our system, judges are themselves members
of the bar and former lawyers, and so can be expected to share a bias toward
the profession.26 In contrast, judges on the continent of Europe have separate
legal training specifically as judges, and few of them have been practicing
lawyers first. The role of advocate and the role of truth-finder are considered
to be different.27 And deciding—let alone investigating—cases on the merits is
25.
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26.
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152 (2010).

27.

Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the

898

Journal of Legal Education

hard work and entails responsibility. Few judges are eager for more work and
more responsibility.
Even the legal academy has been infected with proadversarial bias. The
required first-year, first-semester civil procedure course “focuses almost
exclusively on adversarial courtroom litigation,” (336) as opposed to alternative
dispute resolution proceedings, settlement negotiations, and administrative
hearings. Some academics glorify the idea of the adversarial litigator as “a
warrior on behalf of the public good” (337). To make public policy through
litigation—rather than legislation or regulation—is held out as the highest
professional ideal. Other academics see a spiritual connection between the
adversarial system and a free-market economy. The animating principle
of both, according to Richard Posner (considered here as an academic), is
competition (337).28 But there is a vast difference between voluntary exchanges
for goods and services, and a government-run system of dispute resolution that
ultimately relies on force. In litigation, adversarialism leads to the wealth effect
and the bias effect, with greater cost, delay, and often inaccuracy. Adversarial
competition increases efficiency in a market, but decreases efficiency in
litigation.
Yet we need not despair. There are plausible ways to move the system closer
to the inquisitorial model, and thus lift the burden the lawyers impose and
reduce the wealth and bias effects.
A promising reform Kessler suggests for state and federal courts is to
expand the role of the master and to make masters permanent, salaried judicial
staff (349). This would relieve the parties of their current burden of paying the
master. Kessler emphasizes the importance of finding mechanisms to ensure
the masters’ competence and neutrality. Masters could be tasked with taking
greater control of pretrial discovery, preventing some of the abuse and keeping
the case focused on the merits.
These changes to masters would partially solve the perennial problem
of a shortage of judges. Kessler’s solution seems more likely to come about
than an increase in the number of ordinary judges. Calling for an increase
in ordinary judges tends to trigger protests from sitting judges because their
prestige would be diluted. Proposing a significant increase in ordinary judges
would also provoke partisan battles over appointment and allocation. These
difficulties help to explain the creation in 1968, and growth over the past
fifty years in the number and role, of federal magistrate judges.29 Magistrate
judges, who are not Article III judges and are appointed for a term, have lower
prestige than district judges, and so do not threaten district judges’ dignity or
French Cour d’Assises, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791, 809-12.
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provoke such political battles. The federal judiciary has, in effect, increased
its numbers and stratification. Greater numbers and stratification of judges,
with corresponding possibilities for promotion based on performance, are
important ways nonadversarial systems ensure an adequate and competent
judiciary.
Kessler also makes a valuable suggestion concerning expert witnesses.
Expert testimony in civil cases is today one of the worst features of the
American adversarial system. Trials and hearings degenerate into laughable
battles between dueling “experts,” utterly scripted by the lawyers. Judges are
tasked with keeping junk science out of the courtroom, but Daubert hearings
have themselves become lengthy partisan spectacles. Kessler proposes that
instead of this apotheosis of adversarial cost, delay, and bias, American judges
appoint their own experts. How would a judge choose an expert? Kessler
recommends the French solution, which is also the German solution. French
and German courts maintain rosters of pre-vetted experts on particular topics
in particular geographic areas.30 Kessler also envisions the possibility of using
groups of experts to advise the judge as a sort of special jury.
These reforms point to the ultimate goal of empowering the judge. And we
should have judges worthy of empowerment. To the extent that we hesitate to
give judges more power over litigation because of their bias or incompetence,
there are ways to check those problems. Two possibilities are the use of a
panel of judges, including in the first instance, and a thorough appeal on
the merits, of fact as well as law. Judges should feel personal responsibility
for the substantive correctness of the outcome, and not just sit as umpires or
referees enforcing procedural rules. It’s a measure of how far adversarialism
has triumphed that this is a radical proposition in the United States today.
Lawyers and judges are not going to make this argument. One of the great
advantages we have as academics standing outside the fray is our ability to
critique the legal profession and the legal system. Lawyers and judges have
criticized the legal academy as impractical or useless.31 We have a response.
Virtually the entire American legal system is designed for the benefit of lawyers
at the expense of parties and society as a whole. Legal academics are almost
the only group with the knowledge and freedom to reveal this, and to argue
for much-needed reform.
30.
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